Self-Incrimination and the Use of Income Tax Returns in Non-
Tax Criminal Prosecutions by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 1 Article 10
Spring 3-1-1973
Self-Incrimination and the Use of Income Tax
Returns in Non- Tax Criminal Prosecutions
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Self-Incrimination and the Use of Income Tax Returns in Non- Tax Criminal Prosecutions, 30 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 182 (1973), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol30/iss1/10
182 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE USE OF INCOME
TAX RETURNS IN NON-TAX CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS
The disclosure of income derived from illegal activities as required in
income tax returns may lead to an individual's conviction in a non-tax
criminal prosecution. This situation may occur in spite of the constitu-
tinal guarantee against self-incrimination which is designed to protect the
individual from being compelled by the Government to divulge informa-
tion that would assist in his own prosecution.' Until recently most courts,
under various rationales, have refused to find this fifth amendment pro-
tection in income disclosure cases. Some courts have failed to reach the
question of protection by saying that the disclosures are not in fact suffi-
ciently incriminating.2 Others facing the issue have nevertheless held that
governmental needs were more important than those of the individual'
or that the taxpayer waived his privilege against self-incrimination by
complying with the income tax filing requirements.'
The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Garner v.
United States' suggests that a taxpayer can be afforded sufficient protec-
tion against self-incrimination even though he is required to disclose
incriminating information. Garner was convicted of conspiring to violate
federal gambling statutes.6 To prove that he was a gambler, an essential
element of the conspiracy as charged, the Government introduced into
evidence the defendant's income tax returns in which he reported gam-
bling as the major source of his income. The defendant objected to the
admission of these returns on the ground that certain answers to questions
in the returns would tend to incriminate him. The district court overruled
the objection. 7
'U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." The fifth amendment not only protects against
compulsory production of all testimonial or communicative evidence, but also extends to
written material, books and records. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
'E.g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); United States
v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
'E.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1
(1948); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
'Grimes v. United States, 379 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967);
Stillman v. United States, 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d
110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
5No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972).
6The defendant was charged with conspiracy to violate: 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970),
which prohibits interstate transmission of bets or wagers by a gambler, 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(1970), which prohibits use of an interstate facility to distribute proceeds of unlawful activ-
ity, and 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1970), which makes it a crime to bribe professional athletes.
'No. 71-1219 at 1.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In reversing Garner's conviction, the court of appeals found that ad-
mission of the returns was error because the defendant "was not given
adequate protection from compulsory self-incrimination. The court felt
that submitting to the statutory compulsion to disclose information in an
income tax return did not constitute a voluntary waiver of fifth amend-
ment protections. Consequently, the court held that the Government must
prove its case without using the defendant's income tax returns as evi-
dence." The Government was not prohibited, however, from using the
returns in further tax-related prosecutions; therefore, these returns would
still remain a valuable tool in the enforcement of the internal revenue
laws. In light of the requirements and alternatives facing the taxpayer,
insulating the disclosure from general prosecutory use, as was done in
Garner, may both preserve the essence of the privilege and allow the
Government to acquire needed information.
Everyone subject to pay income tax must file a return9 regardless of
the source of income."0 A refusal to file is thus not a practical alternative
for a person wishing to conceal the source of income derived from illegal
gambling activities. However, once a gambler is required to file, the
protection from self-incrimination may be lost entirely.
A doctrine espoused by the Supreme Court's decision in Shapiro v.
United States" exemplifies the extent to which the privilege may be abro-
gated. The "required records" doctrine 2 of Shapiro provides that a per-
son may not claim the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination as to records which he is required by law to preserve. 3 He
sThe requirement that the Government must prove its case without the help of the
accused is a fundamental belief of our criminal justice system. Address by Paul P. Lipton
at the Judicial Conference for the Sixth Circuit, May 24, 1968, in 45 F.R.D. 293, 323 (1968).
'Section 6011 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 requires the making of a return,
and section 7203 makes it a crime to fail to file any return. The Supreme Court has
sustained this filing requirement even where the reporting of illegal gains tends to incrimi-
nate the taxpayer. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
"This requirement has been upheld in a variety of illegal gain situations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (illicit traffic in liquor); Chadick v. United
States, 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 609 (1935) (graft); Humphreys v.
Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 857 (1940), affd, 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1942) (ransom money
received by a kidnapper); Droge v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937) (lotteries); Rickard
v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 316 (1929) (illegal prize fighting picture); Werner v. Commis-
sioner, 10 B.T.A. 905 (1928) (card playing); M'Kenna v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 326
(1925) (racetrack bookmaking).
"335 U.S. 1 (1948) (5-4 decision).
"The courts and commentators have labeled the language contained in Shapiro as the
"required records" doctrine. See, e.g., Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 55 (1968). See
generally Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 18 U. CHi. L. Rav. 687 (1951); Redlich, Searches, Seizures, and Self-
Incrimination in Tax Cases, 10 TAX L. REv. 191 (1954); Note, Required Information and
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 681 (1965).
13335 U.S. at 33. The Shapiro majority based its holding on Wilson v. United States,
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may neither claim the privilege in refusing to keep the required records
nor may he claim the privilege to prevent the admission of the records in
a later trial. 4 The doctrine was originally formulated in order that needed
information about the operation of maximum price legislation could be
obtained, 5 but on occasion it has been extended to income tax records
required to be kept by taxpayers.' In addition to records that are re-
tained, the doctrine may apply to reports that must be filed, e.g., income
tax returns.' Indeed, from the time of the doctrine's inception, it has been
felt that the Government could completely destroy the privilege against
self-incrimination by simply designating reports as being required. 8 Yet,
in spite of severe criticism, the doctrine has not been overruled. 9
In Marchetti v. United States, 0 however, the Supreme Court declined
to apply the doctrine to a tax-related registration provision, the form"'
for which the Court felt was analogous to an income tax return.2 2 Mar-
chetti was convicted for conspiring to evade payment of an occupational
221 U.S. 361 (1911), which held that corporate records were not protected by the fifth
amendment. There was also language in Wilson to the effect that the immunity provision
of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 did not apply to "records which are required by
law to be kept. ... Id. at 380. From this dicta, the majority in Shapiro reasoned that
the required keeping of a record was sufficient to make it non-privileged. Justice Frank-
furter felt the majority opinion in Shaprio rested on dubious authority. 335 U.S. at 62
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"335 U.S. at 33 n.42.
"Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970).
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6001 requires a taxpayer to keep records to show whether
he is liable for tax. The taxpayer does not have to file these records with his returns but
must keep them to substantiate his returns in case of an audit. In United States v. Clancy,
276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961) and Falsone v.
United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953), the "required
records" doctrine was held applicable to this situation.
'TFor example, although not specifically an income tax case, the Court in Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39, 56 n.14 (1968), could detect no meaningful difference between
a requirement that records be kept and one which required that records, such as income
tax returns, be filed.
"Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent in Shapiro felt that Congress might have the
tendency to extend the requirements even more, thereby narrowing the privilege against self-
incrimination considerably. If the doctrine is extended to its fullest reach, it is capable of
entirely destroying the privilege. 335 U.S. at 70 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
"Mr. Justice Fortas, however, indicated a desire to re-examine the doctrine in Spevack
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519 (1967) (concurring opinion). Two district court decisions have
declined to follow Shapiro in matters involving income tax records required to be kept. See
United States v. Remolif, 227 F. Supp. 420 (D. Nev. 1964); In re Daniels, 140 F. Supp.
322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
-390 U.S. 39 (1968).
2 nternal Revenue Service Form 11-C requires that registrants provide their residence
and business addresses, indicate whether they are engaged in the business of accepting
wagers, and list the names and addresses of their agents and employees.
=ld. at 43.
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tax imposed upon gamblers; and for failing to comply with an internal
revenue provision4 which requires those liable for the occupational tax
to supply detailed information. The issue of the relevance of the "required
records" doctrine arose because the gambler was required to supply infor-
mation concerning his activities. The Court felt that Shapiro was limited
to areas of inquiry which were either non-criminal or regulatory and that
the provisions questioned in Marchetti were neither. 8 The Court also
emphasized that the principal interest of the Government in requiring the
registration is the collection of revenue, perhaps indicating that the Court
would not apply the doctrine to an area of inquiry, such as gambling,
unrelated to the Government's main interest.
6
The fact situation of Garner was very similar to that of Marchetti.
Information was to be supplied in Marchetti by a registration form analo-
gous to the tax return filed in Garner. Since both oases involve matters
of taxation, an area generally characterized as non-regulatory," the Gov-
ernment's interest in both cases was collection of revenue and not prose-
cution of gamblers. Following the rationale of Marchetti, the Shapiro
decision would not seem applicable to Garner.
Moreover, the doctrine's application in the context of income tax
returns which reveal non-tax criminal behavior seems inapposite. The
doctrine permits acquisition of information in order that laws may func-
tion properly. 8 In the collection of revenue, information is needed solely
to determine the correct tax liability of taxpayers; therefore, further infor-
mation pointing to criminality and not essential to the determination of
tax liability may be withheld from non-tax criminal prosecutions without
hindering the revenue collection process. Consequently, the reason for the
utilization of the doctrine was absent in Garner, and it seems that the
court was correct in not applying the doctrine.
29
Although the "required records" doctrine and its abrogation of the
privilege against self-incrimination seem inapplicable to income disclo-
sure situations, the protection against self-incrimination may nevertheless
be inadequate. A leading case illustrating this inadequacy is United States
v. Sullivan"0 which dealt with the relationship between the fifth amend-
2Irr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4411.
21INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4412.
2390 U.S. at 57. As an area of inquiry, taxation in general might be described as non-
regulatory. See Address by Paul P. Lipton at the Judicial Conference for the Sixth Circuit,
May 24, 1968, in 45 F.R.D. 293, 323, 324 n.9 (1968).
26390 U.S. at 57.
7'Note 25 and accompanying text supra.
2Text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
"From the purpose of the doctrine and the fact situation in Garner, it seems obvious
that the doctrine should not apply. However, the court was silent on this point, not mention-
ing "required records" or Shapiro.
-274 U.S. 259 (1927).
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ment and the income tax reporting statute. Sullivan made his living sell-
ing moonshine whiskey and, rather than risk prosecution, did not file an
income tax return. The Court held that a person could not refuse to file
a return on the ground that certain disclosures in the return would tend
to incriminate him. If answers to specific questions in the return might
incriminate the taxpayer, he could claim the privilege against self-
incrimination and refuse to answer those questions.3' The Court, how-
ever, failed to enumerate the particular questions which might tend to be
incriminating.
Before the taxpayer may refuse to answer questions in the return, the
standard for the invocation of the fifth amendment privilege must be met.
This standard has varied from requiring that an answer have the "tend-
ency to incriminate ' 3 2 to allowing the claim of the privilege only if "real
and substantial hazards of self-incrimination" exist.3 3 Recent cases have
followed the later approach,34 although some courts seem to prefer a
more moderate guideline which requires that an answer be a "significant
link in the chain leading to prosecution.
'35
There can be no doubt that when Garner reported the source of his
income as being derived from illegal gambling, he was furnishing a "link
in the chain" leading to his prosecution and conviction .3  He would
therefore be able to claim the privilege and refuse to answer the incrimi-
nating questions. Whether this would be the most viable choice among
the possible alternatives is a matter of conjecture. Since a taxpayer must
file an income tax return,3 he has only three practical choices with
regard to incriminating questions in the return: decline to answer, answer,
or invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and decline to answer.
If the practical effect of all the alternatives is the implication of the
3"Id. at 263-64.
31See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 201 (1955) ("may tend to be
incriminatory"); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) ("might tend to subject to
criminal responsibility").
• See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429 (1971); United States v. Freed, 401
U.S. 601, 606 (1971); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 18 (1969); Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85, 97 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67 (1968); Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53-54 (1968).
uld.
3Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964). The "link in the chain" criterion originated
in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
uSince gambling is a highly regulated area which abounds with criminal statutes,
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44-46 (1968), the meeting of these tests should be
a simple matter because of the very nature of such an occupation.
3Note 9 supra. Failure to file is suspicious as well as illegal. For instance, if all persons
earning above a certain amount are required to file a return, then one could infer that either
a person made below the requisite amount or that he is not filing in an attempt to conceal
some illegal gain.
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taxpayer in the commission of a crime, the requirement that he must file
a return may be constitutionally suspect.
A gambler who files an income tax return and fails to disclose the
source of his income without claiming the privilege faces possible self-
incrimination in a number of respects. Because of the nature of Garner's
occupation, the taxation of his income fell under special provisions of the
internal revenue laws." The ordinary taxpayer must, of course, supply
the Government with the necessary information showing whether he qual-
ifies for the deductions, expenses and losses he claims. The gambler must
also supply this information, although a different set of rules applies for
his computation of these three items.39 A person who computes his in-
come tax using these special gambling provisions must reveal his source
of income in order for the Internal Revenue Service to ascertain whether
the tax was computed correctly. Clearly, a person who files a return,
using these provisions to compute his taxable income without disclosing
its source, would hardly escape the attention of the Internal Revenue
Service. An investigation would likely follow, and he could be convicted
for failing to supply requested information," as well as for violations of
gambling prohibition statutes. With all the harmful consequences attend-
ant upon a refusal to answer, it is likely that the taxpayer will choose one
of the other alternatives.
The second alternative, that of filing a return and reporting the source
of income as being derived from gambling, eliminates the exploratory
step necessitated when the source is withheld and greatly increases the
likelihood of prosecution under one of many federal statutes that per-
meate the area of gambling.4 Under present Treasury Regulations the
returns are surrendered upon request to any United States Attorney,42 the
Justice Department,43 and any other establishment of the Federal Gov-
13Ier. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(d) provides that a person whose income is derived
from gambling may deduct his gamling losses only to the extent of his winnings from
gambling. For the state of the law pertaining to gambling and income taxation, see 5 J.
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 28.85 (1969).
391d.
I
0 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7203 makes it a crime to willfully fail to file any return,
pay any tax, or supply any requested information. In what appears to be a questionable
decision, Sanders v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1955), the taxpayer was found
guilty of failing to file a return, although he filed "skeleton" returns containing his name
and address and amount of tax due, but "no detailed information as to income or deduc-
tions." It seems that the more logical prosecution would have been under § 7203 (failing
to supply any information).
"The provisions applicable to the prosecution of a gambler are as follows: 15
U.S.C. §§ 1171-78 (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1970); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-84 (1970); 18
U.S.C. §§ 1301-06 (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952-53, 1955 (1970);
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
"'reas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-l(g) (1961).
"Id.
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ernment."1 As a result of the information found in the return, the Govern-
ment may wish to commence an investigation of the individual, initiate
prosecution, or use the information against the individual at trial.,
Another consequence that may result from answering the questions
is waiver of the constitutonal protection. 6 Sullivan held that a person may
claim the privilege against self-incriminating questions in an income tax
return . 7 Several circuit court cases have interpreted the Sullivan lan-
guage" additionally to mean that if a person answered the incriminating
questions in the tax return, he voluntarily waived the privilege." The
majority in Garner, however, argued that this reasoning was erroneous
because the waiver in this situation was involuntary. 5 A "cruel trilema" 51
"Id. at § 301.6103(a)-l(f) (1961).
"The role which Garner's income tax returns played in the investigation of his case or
in the decision as to how to prosecute is uncertain.
"If an individual testifies against himself when not compelled to do so, he has waived
his constitutional protection. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943); see United
States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927). However, the Court has
indulged in every reasonable presumption against such an occurrence. Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
"Text accompanying note 31 supra.
"The language referred to is:
If the form of the return called for answers that the defendant was privi-
leged from making he could have raised the objection in the return ....
But if the defendant desired to test that or any other point he should have
tested it in the return so that it could have been passed upon.
274 U.S. at 263-64.
"Grimes v. United States, 379 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846
(1967); Stillman v. United States, 177 F.2d 607, 618 (9th Cir. 1949); Shushan v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110, 117-18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). The Stillman
court's reasoning on this point was as follows:
The income tax returns were voluntarily executed by appellants under
oath. They were not made in compliance with a subpoena or court order,
nor were they made under the threat of prosecution or induced by any
form of compulsion save that reflected in the duty of every person to
report all forms of taxable income in the manner prescribed by our Inter-
nal Revenue Laws.
If appellants believed that certain declarations in their tax returns
might incriminate them they could have refrained from making the volun-
tary tax declarations here in evidence. However, they chose to report the
illicit income rather than risk possible prosecution for making false or
incomplete returns covering such income. The disclosures upon the tax
returns must therefore be deemed to have been voluntarily entered upon
a public record.
177 F.2d at 618 (emphasis added).
"The fallacy of saying a person has waived his privilege because he complied with a
statutory scheme by answering incriminating questions is discussed by the Garner court:
It is one thing to say that government can compel a person to make
disclosures which are deemed necessary for government to adequately
administer a program such as the revenue collection system. It is entirely
NOTES AND COMMENTS
was forced upon the defendant, thereby rendering his choice to answer
the questions involuntary. If he filed the return and answered the ques-
tions truthfully, he would be incriminating himself by declaring the source
of his income as being derived from illegal gains; if he answered the
questions untruthfully, he would have been subjecting himself to a perjury
charge; and if he failed to file a return, he would have been violating a
statute. Garner may be evincing a new trend since heretofore the waiver
theory has gone unchallenged by the courts. At present, however, there
is a conflict between the circuits52 on this particular issue, and until a
decision by the Supreme Court, a taxpayer may still be convicted in a
non-tax prosecution with the help of his own involuntary disclosures.
The final alternative available to the taxpayer is that of refusing to
answer and claiming the privilege as suggested by Sullivan." But even
claiming the privilege does not provide adequate protection from self-
incrimination. The act of claiming the privilege is inherently suspicious.
If Garner had filed a return and stated that he received a large amount
of income from an unnamed source and that he was withholding disclo-
sure of the source because it would tend to incriminate, the authorities
would likely infer that he was engaged in an illegal enterprise."4 An offi-
cial investigation would likely ensue and perhaps uncover other facts
which would lead to the initiation of a criminal prosecution." The claim-
ing of the privilege thus becomes the "first link in the chain" leading to
prosecution.
Apparently, a taxpayer like Garner has no protection from self-
incrimination when he is required to file income tax returns. Unless the
taxpayer can be afforded this protection, the filing requirement upheld
by Sullivan seems unconstitutional. Only the abolition of the general
requirement to report income would entirely eliminate the danger of
incrimination, but this would ignore the realities of the revenue collection
system. Information must be gathered in order that the Government can
operate this system efficiently and equitably. Thus, a clash between the
another matter, however, to then disregard the fact that the disclosure was
forced and to say that, since the original purpose of compelling disclosure
was not inherently hazardous to an individual's rights, any subsequent use
of that compelled information is the use of "volunteered" information and
therefore constitutonally inoffensive.
No. 71-1219 at 6-7.
51The term "cruel trilema" comes from Justice Goldberg's opinion in Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
"2Grimes v. United States, 379 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846
(1967), at present is the only other circuit court which has decided this issue and its conclu-
sion is opposite that of Garner.
'l'ext accompanying note 31 supra.
"E. GRIswALD, THE FiFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 56 (1955).
mId. at 55.
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privilege against self-incrimination and the Government's need for infor-
mation inevitably occurs.56 In spite of this clash and the difficulties it
presents, there are ways to protect the taxpayer and secure needed infor-
mation.
Prohibiting the Internal Revenue Service from disclosing the returns
and information contained therein would be one technique by which both
values could be accommodated." The taxpayer would have no fear of
incrimination while the Government would receive the data it needs in the
revenue collection process."
Another way in which the Government may acquire the information
it needs without infringing upon an individual's privilege against self-
incrimination is a statutory grant of immunity from prosecution.59 Free-
dom from prosecution for a crime related to the testimony given is ex-
changed for information needed by the Government." Even though the
information may be incriminating, the individual who receives the grant
may not refuse to give the requested information."' For a grant of immun-
ity to be effective, however, all danger of self-incrimination must be
removed. Consequently, the Court has held that in order for the immunity
to be valid, it must be coextensive with the privilege it displaces.
2
Since an immunity must totally preclude prosecution for any offense
related to the compelled disclosure in order to be constitutionally suffi-
cient,63 it is a broader solution than that needed in income tax situations.
Granting immunity from prosecution in exchange for compelled answers
to questions in an income tax return would be tantamount to allowing to
criminal to exculpate himself. For example, the disclosure of income
derived from gambling would result in a total immunity from gambling
offense prosecutions.
"California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971).
57At the very least, this solution would entail repeal of the Treasury Regulations dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
"Such a result was reached in relation to the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5801
et seq. (1970). In Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 95-100 (1968), the Supreme Court
held that the privilege against self-incrimination provides a full defense to a governmental
prosecution of a person for failure to register a firearm under the National Firearms Act.
Information collected under this Act was made available to prosecuting officials. After the
decision, the Act was amended by Congress to prevent the disclosure to law enforcement
officials that was heretofore allowed. In a subsequent case, United States v. Freed, 401 U.S.
601 (1971), the constitutonality of the Act as amended was upheld.
"9More than forty federal statutes grant immunity from prosecution. Federal immunity
statutes are listed in Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice:
Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1571-78 (1963).
"Justice White explained the role of immunity statutes in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52, 93 (1964) (concurring opinion).
"1Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
12Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
OCounselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
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The Garner court's restriction on prosecutory use is a more narrow
solution than that provided by an immunity and seems to be an excellent
way to alleviate the predicament encountered by members of Garner's
occupation. 4 Information that may be incriminating would still be com-
pelled but could not be disclosed for other than specified purposes."
There is a restriction only on a particular use and not an absolute prohibi-
tion against prosecution relating to matters revealed in the disclosure.
However, any prosecution subsequent to the compelled disclosure must
be based on evidence obtained independently of that disclosure.6
A use-restriction is an effective means of accommodating values: it
permits information to be gathered in order to fulfill a valid governmental
need for such information, while it also protects the individual by remov-
ing the possibility of incrimination as a result of his disclosures. A use-
restriction may also be viewed as a means of correcting constitutional
abuses. If a requirement entails disclosures that are incriminating, a re-
striction barring use of the disclosures in a way which exploits their
incriminatory aspects would remove the fifth amendment objection to the
requirement. 7
Although a use-restriction is an effective judicial tool, there is a limi-
tation to its application. When a criminal prosecution is related to the
area about which information is sought, practical considerations con-
strain the application of the use-restriction." For example, its impracti-
"This was the approach taken by the majority in Garner. The dissent in Garner pointed
out that the use-restriction concept was rejected in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
However, these cases are distinguishable. Text accompanying notes 6976 infra.
65See generally McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. Cr. REV.
193, 229-31.
eOnce the return is filed, prosecution can take place only if the Government can
demonstrate that its evidence is not tainted by the incriminatory aspects of the return.
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 712 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
'The sequence of events that transpired after the Supreme Court's decision in Hanes
v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), is illustrative of the way in which a constitutional
defect may be rectified by the imposition of a use-restriction. In Hanes, possessors of illegal
firearms were required by the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. (1970), to
register with the Federal Government. Names of those who registered were made available
to state, local, and other federal officials. The Court felt that the entire statutory scheme
was designed to force persons engaged in illegal activity to incriminate themselves despite
the protection afforded by the fifth amendment.
Congress revised the statute to prohibit the use of the information in a criminal prose-
cution. The amendment stated that no information provided in compliance with the Act can
be used directly or indirectly as evidence against the registrant or applicant "in a criminal
proceeding with respect to a violation of law occurring prior to or concurrently with the
filing of the application or registration, or the compiling of the records containing the
information or evidence." 26 U.S.C. § 5848 (1970); see 26 C.F.R. § 179.202 (1970). When
this revision was tested in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), the Court held that
the use-restriction remedied the defect found in Hanes.
"In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60 (1968), the Court refused to apply a
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cality in a related crime situation is demonstrated by the facts of
California v. Byers."9 In Byers, the petitioner attacked the constitution-
ality of California's "Hit & Run" statute0 by arguing that if he complied
with the statute, he would be incriminating himself. The statute directs
drivers involved in motor vehicle accidents resulting in property damage
to stop at the scene and give their name and address to the driver or owner
of the other vehicle. If the driver has committed a violation of the motor
vehicle laws" and does stop and reveal his identity, he supplies the "essen-
tial link in the chain needed to prosecute" by focusing attention upon
himself as a participant in an auto accident which involves a probable
criminal prosecution. The California Supreme Court deemed this revela-
tion sufficiently incriminating and accordingly barred its use in subse-
quent prosecutions for violations of traffic laws."
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. It emphasized that the
government's need for information and the privilege against self-
incrimination must be balanced.73 The State of California needed infor-
mation to aid in the determination of civil liability resulting from traffic
accidents, to evaluate the effectiveness of traffic laws, and to aid in the
enforcement of those laws.74 The ability to secure this needed information
was viewed as more important than the individual's privilege against self-
incrimination since the possibility of self-incrimination was not great. 75
On the basis of this reasoning, the Court concluded that it was unneces-
sary to impose a use-restriction on the incriminating disclosures.
The distinguishing characteristic between the use-restriction of
Garner and that of Byers is the class of offenses addressed by each. The
use-restriction imposed by the California Supreme Court was directly
use-restriction in connection with a wagering tax. The names of those who paid the tax were
made available to interested prosecuting authorities. Inasmuch as Congress specifically
desired such a result, the Court felt that to impose use-restrictions would be to legislate a
result contrary to the wish of Congress. Id. 58-59. The restriction in Marchetti seems
distinguishable from that of Garner because the criminal statute sought to be enforced in
Marchetti was directly related to the purpose for which the information was needed.
69402 U.S. 424 (1971) (plurality opinion).
"
0
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 20002 (West 1971).
7 In this case the defendant was charged with improper passing pursuant to § 21750
of the Cal. Vehicle Code (West 1971).
"Byers v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1044-45, 458 P.2d 465,470-71, 80 Cal. Rptr.
553, 558-59 (1969).
73California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971). But this balancing inevitably results
in the dilution of constitutional guarantees. The fifth amendment establishes the amount of
protection given and the circumstances in which it applies. To give any less protection is to
fail to apply the privilege correctly. It seems, therefore, that any balancing approach is
unsatisfactory. See, e.g., Konigsburg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
'Byers v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969).
71402 U.S. at 430.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
related to the traffic laws, and of course would prevent a number of traffic
prosecutions." To exculpate himself a person need only obey the Act; no
information he supplied could be used against him in the trial for a traffic
violation arising in conjunction with the traffic accident. The Garner use-
restriction, however, was directed at an area unrelated to the revenue
collecting process.
By correctly applying the use-restriction, the Garner court has re-
moved the inequities accompanying Sullivan's requirement that everyone
must file an income tax return. Addition of a use-restriction saves the
filing requirement from being declared unconstitutional in its compulsion
of self-incrimination. The taxpayer would thus be afforded protection in
non-tax criminal prosecutions, an area where heretofore he had none. It
is hoped that the use-restriction approach of Garner will be followed in
future decisions involving income tax return requirements as well as other
filing requirements. Notwithstanding its possible later application,
Garner's present significance is that it represents the antithesis of earlier
judicial thinking on the issue of self-incrimination and the income tax
laws.
JOHN FRANCIS HANZEL
7Justice Harlan felt that a use-restriction imposed in this case would "render doubtful
the State's ability to prosecute in a large class of cases where illegal driving has caused
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